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Using Metaphor in Legal Analysis

and Communication
A Symposium of the
Mercer Law Review
November 10, 2006
The Centrality of Metaphor in
Legal Analysis and
Communication:
An Introduction
by David T. Ritchie*
Law, as a domain of human enterprise, is fundamentally discursive in
nature. As such, understanding the elements of legal discourse, both
analytical and communicative, is vital to understanding the nature of
the enterprise. Metaphorical reasoning, and the communication of that
reasoning, is one such element. Perhaps metaphor is one among many
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elements of legal discourse. In this view, metaphor theory would take
its place alongside logic, narrative theory, rhetoric, and so on.
Some would suggest, however, that metaphor is more central than this
account would suggest. In particular, the groundbreaking work of
philosopher Mark Johnson and cognitive linguist George Lakoff makes
the case that metaphor is absolutely central to human understanding
and communication.1 This claim, which is called "cognitive or conceptual metaphor theory," has had profound influence in many fields of
human intellectual endeavor over the past twenty-five years or so. As
law is a human discourse community, the claim can be applied in the
context of legal analysis and communication.2 This was the inspiration
for the development of the Mercer Law Review symposium on "Metaphor
in Legal Analysis and Communication," held November 10, 2006 in
Macon, Georgia.
The initial idea, conceived by Michael Smith and myself, was to bring
together key figures to discuss how cognitive metaphor theory works and
what its specific application to legal analysis and communication might
be. With the aid and support of the members of the Mercer Law Review
and with help from several members of the faculty and administration
of the Mercer University School of Law (particularly Linda Edwards,
Daisy H. Floyd, Hal Lewis, and Jack Sammons), Michael Smith and I
were able to plan and develop a program that accomplished this goal.
The symposium brought together important representatives of the fields
of cognitive science, legal communication, legal theory, philosophy, and
religion to discuss the nature of metaphor and its application to the field
of law. The presentations and the discussion that followed were
innovative and breathtaking in their scope. The members of this panel
brought home, in a real and profound way, the recognition that we "live
by"3' certain metaphors; in law and in life.
The well-known philosopher and cognitive theorist Mark Johnson, one
of the fathers of cognitive metaphor theory, started the symposium by
explaining the cognitive theory of metaphor.4 His explanation left little
doubt about the central nature of metaphor in our cognitive and
analytical processes. According to Mark Johnson, everything that we
think and communicate is formed, at some level, by metaphorical
constructs that give us context and intellectual reference points upon
which to attach our understanding. Drawing on his work with George

1. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
2. See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND
(2001).
3. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 1.
4. Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor,Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845 (2007).
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Lakoff, Johnson set out the relationship between a superficial understanding of metaphor as a mere literary device and a deeper cognitive
understanding that impacts the very nature of human reasoning. By
discussing the embodied effects of certain metaphorical constructs he
illustrated the profound interests that are often at stake if we fail to
recognize this deeper conceptual understanding. The domain of law is
particularly relevant in this regard.
This point was further developed by legal theorist Steven Winter, who
has built upon the work of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff and
developed a robust conception of cognitive legal reasoning.5
His
presentation set out this conception, utilizing well known examples of
metaphorical constructs in legal opinions by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Charles Evan Hughes, and others. Winter amply illustrated the breadth
of the impact cognitive metaphor has on legal reasoning by discussing
cases from areas as diverse as commerce, free speech, and labor
relations.
By drawing on this wide variety of examples, Winter
proved-for many of us at least-that in the law we "live by" important
metaphors that have a direct and lived impact on millions of people in
the United States. His illustrations showed the depth of cognitive
metaphors in legal analysis and discourse, thus providing further
evidence for Johnson and Lakoff's point that metaphor theory is
fundamental to our understanding.
The religious philosopher and social critic Michael Goldberg picked up
these themes, discussing the metaphorical construct behind the Eighth
Amendment's6 ban on cruel and unusual punishment.7 This construct,
captured largely by the metaphor of "acting humanely," truly shows how
existential and important metaphors can be. By discussing this one
example, Goldberg illustrated the stark and troubling implications of the
framework developed by Mark Johnson and Steve Winter. Narratives
surrounding the debate over capital punishment employ metaphors that
are perhaps misplaced and contradictory. Goldberg also brought to the
fore one important consideration about metaphor that deserves
acknowledgment; the idea that when we adopt one metaphorical
construct ("acting humanely" by executing criminals using quasi-medical
procedures, for example), we cover over other possible metaphors that
would completely change the nature of the discourse. Political and legal
debates are, then, contingent and situated. These debates are dependent
on the metaphors embedded in the discourse used. Changing the
metaphors can change the debates. Constructing new metaphors to

5.
6.
7.

Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law, 58 MERCER L. REv. 869 (2007).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Michael Goldberg, Against Acting 'Humanely',58 MERCER L. REV. 899 (2007).
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replace the old metaphors can have a powerful impact on the way we see
the world and how we engage in discourse. Indeed, it can mean the
difference between life and death.
This was addressed squarely by our last two presenters: Michael
Smith and Linda Berger-both experts in legal writing and communication. Michael Smith discussed the relationship between superficial
linguistic conceptions of metaphor and the deeper cognitive conception.8
His presentation, an application of his groundbreaking work on
understanding and developing metaphors,9 showed the power of legal
professionals to construct discourse and use that discourse to explain
existential problems and persuade others. Linda Berger's presentation,
which flows from her innovative work on metaphor theory,'0 drew upon
Smith's views by showing how the construction of certain metaphors in
the context of corporate personhood and commercial speech have farreaching implications in the U.S. political and economic system."
Taken together, these two contributions to the Symposium show most
clearly the practical and pragmatic application of cognitive metaphor
theory to legal professionals and practitioners.
Cognitive metaphor theory opens a whole host of concepts and
perspectives that can help us understand our discourse communities.
For those in the legal profession, the work represented in this Symposium volume of the Mercer Law Review is a wonderful nutshell
explaining how cognitive metaphor theory can-and does-have a
profound impact on our conception of law and legal practice. The
contributions contained in this volume give both an introduction to the
basic theoretical perspectives on metaphor and law, and provide a
sustained discussion of how these perspectives can impact the work of
legal professionals. Many of the same things could be said about views
on logic, narrative theory, and rhetoric. Those arguments, though, will
have to await another day and other forums. The contributors to this
volume as well as the participants and attendees of the Mercer Law
Review Symposium have seen firsthand, however, how central cognitive

8. Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in PersuasiveLegal Writing, 58 MERCER L.
REV. 919 (2007).
9. See generally MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND
STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING (2002).
10. See generally Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound ofthe CorporationSpeaking? How
the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASSN LEGAL
WRITING DuRECToRs 169 (2004).
11. Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor,Metonymy, and CorporateMoney: Rhetorical Choices
in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949
(2007).
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metaphor theory is to human understanding and especially to legal
analysis and communication.

